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HARMS TO ‘OTHERS’ AND THE 
SELECTION AGAINST DISABILITY VIEW 
 
ABSTRACT: In recent years the question of whether prospective parents might have a moral 
obligation to select against disability in their offspring has piqued the attention of many prominent 
philosophers and bioethicists and a large literature has emerged surrounding this question. Rather than 
looking to the most common arguments given in support of a positive response to the above question 
such as those focusing on the harms disability may impose on the child created, duties and role-specific 
obligations and impersonal ‘harms’, a less commonly made set of arguments is focused upon which 
look to the harms that a decision not to select against disability may impose on others. Three different 
possible arguments supporting a limited duty of disability avoidance are thus identified and 
subsequently explored: harms to parents themselves, harms to existing family members and harms to 
other existing members of society. 
 





The reproductive realm – historically characterised as overwhelmingly dominated by chance – has 
steadily become an arena over which individuals have the potential to exercise a significant degree of 
choice and control. In general terms, shifts in public and individual attitudes as well as the 
liberalisation of abortion laws and the ready availability of contraception have meant that in many 
nation states persons can now choose when and whether to procreate.  More specifically, significant 
increases in human knowledge regarding the mechanisms of inheritance and the subsequent 
development of carrier, pre-implantation and pre-natal testing technologies have also greatly increased 
the potential for reproductive choice where such choice is desired.  
 
Such technologies have been used for a number of purposes such as sex selection for reasons of ‘family 
balancing’ or personal preference, and to create children who are tissue matched to existing siblings. 
However, although this is so the value of their availability - in terms of the creation of additional and 
meaningful choice – is often thought to be most clearly seen in their use for the purpose of selection 
against disability and disease. For, whilst historically individuals at a greater risk than average of 
conceiving and birthing children with serious genetic diseases or disabilities, and who would prefer not 
to do so, were faced with only three real options when it came to reproduction: to remain childless, to 
adopt, or to gamble and reproduce naturally, the availability of genetic testing technologies has meant 
that the choices available to such persons regarding reproduction have greatly increased. Couples or 
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single reproducers may, after all, now make a considered choice, not only among the options 
historically available to them, but regarding whether or not to utilise donor gametes after carrier testing 
has revealed a high likelihood of disease or disabling genetic traits in a fetus/embryo, which embryos 
to implant using IVF after pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, whether or not to continue with a 
pregnancy after pre-natal testing has revealed the presence of such traits in a fetus. Indeed, such 
technologies have also provided prospective parents with the opportunity, should they desire to make 
use of it, to prepare for the birth of a child who may have complex medical or social needs.  
 
Yet, although in many senses the increasing availability of genetic testing technologies should be seen 
to be autonomy fostering, it has also prompted many to consider the relative moral obligations of 
prospective parents towards both their potential offspring and society as a whole and ask what should, 
and should not be done with the knowledge that we may now acquire. The questions raised by such 
technologies are many, ranging from the rather generic yet still unresolved question of the moral status 
of the human embryo/fetus, to fears about discrimination against those with ‘undesirable’ 
characteristics and slippery slopes into a Gattaca style situation of designer children and a genetic 
underclass. Unsurprisingly then, some have questioned whether such selection technologies and 
techniques should even be available to prospective parents, and objected to their use in all or most 
circumstances for a number of moral reasons.1 However, whilst such contentions are undoubtedly 
interesting and warrant close examination elsewhere, this paper is concerned only with one form of 
selection, selection against disability, and whether prospective parents may not only be permitted – it 
will be assumed that they should – but morally required, at least in certain circumstances, to avail 
themselves of such technologies and take active steps to screen out disability in their offspring.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Those who make such arguments have suggested variously, although this is by no means an exhaustive list that selective 
reproduction will be morally impermissible in all/the vast majority of situations in virtue of the special moral status of the human 
embryo/fetus (see, for example: P. Singer. 2011. Practical Ethics, 3rd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 125 for 
an exploration of the classic pro-life argument and D. Marquis, 1989. 'Why Abortion Is Immoral', The Journal of Philosophy, 86 
(4): 188-194 for an example of the potentiality argument for the full moral status of the human embryo), the belief that selective 
reproduction is offensive to those whose traits are selected against: sending out the message that they are of less value than those 
with different traits (for an example of this argument see: A. Asch. 2003. 'Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory 
or Compatible', Florida State University Law Review, 30 (2): 315-342), the view that selection treats our prospective children as 
a means to an end and is thus incompatible with the virtues who often associate with parenthood (See, for example: E. Parens 
and A. Asch. 1999. 'The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations', The 
Hastings Centre Report, 29 (5): S5-S6 and S. Vehmas. 2001. 'Just Ignore It? Parents and Genetic Information', Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics, 22 (5): 473-484), and the suggestion that the availability of such technologies may serve to degrade both 
the parent-child relationship and common conceptions of justice and the relationships that obtain between different members of 
society (See, for example: M. J. Sandel, 2007, The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknapp Press: 49-50  ). 
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This question has been raised in the media in response to cases of selection for traits widely viewed to 
be disabling. The most high profile of such cases is that of Sharon Duchesneau and Candace 
McCullough, a deaf couple who ensured the birth of two deaf children in the early 2000’s via the use of 
a fifth generation deaf sperm donor (Spriggs 2002, 283-87). In this case it was asked whether the 
couple might have been morally obliged to select a hearing donor in order to increase their chances of 
conceiving hearing children or to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in order to select a hearing 
embryo. Indeed, so strong was the public reaction to this case that in 2008 the law governing the uses 
of assisted reproductive technology in England and Wales was amended to include a clause prohibiting 
their use for the purpose of selection for disability (HFEA, 2008, s. 14(4)). This question has also been 
raised in cases where individuals know they are at a greater than average risk of conceiving offspring 
who are likely to be disabled and choose to leave their offspring’s health to chance rather than avail 
themselves of selection techniques such as gamete donation, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and 
pre-natal diagnosis to lessen that risk. A good example of such a case is that of Bree Walker Lampley, 
an American television personality with Ectrodactyly who, “became the subject of a public discussion 
about whether it was appropriate to conceive a child who faced a 50-50 chance of inheriting the same 
condition” (Charo and Rothenburg 1994, 105) after she was condemned on a nationally broadcast radio 
show for her decision to reproduce (Parens and Asch 1999, S10).   
 
Indeed, a preference for selection against disability has also become evident in public attitudes towards 
those who, despite no knowledge of increased risk, unexpectedly discover genetic abnormalities liable 
to result in disability in a fetus. Dena Davis, for example, has noted that despite the fact that twenty 
years ago upon seeing a woman in the supermarket with a child who has Down Syndrome her 
“immediate reactions were sympathy and a sense that that woman could be me” she is now “more 
likely to wonder why she didn’t get tested” (Davis 2001, 18). Such an observation on Davis’ part, 
whilst not a direct condemnation, does seem to suggest that for some, selection against disability is no 
longer viewed as just one among many equally acceptable actions a woman may take upon discovery 
of fetal abnormality but the most desirable of such routes. Indeed, less subtle and more striking is the 
example of the recent media furore surrounding some remarks made by the evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins on a social media site where he suggested that to bring a child with Down Syndrome 
into the world when one could have an abortion constitutes an immoral act (Dawkins, 2014).  
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The question of whether prospective parents might have a moral obligation to select against disability 
in their offspring has thus unsurprisingly piqued the attention of many prominent philosophers and 
bioethicists and a large literature has emerged on this topic. Some have couched their discussions in 
positive terms: asking if there might be a moral obligation to create the best child possible. In most 
cases however, regardless of whether the question is framed positively or negatively, it is evaluated by 
consideration of values such as parental autonomy, the welfare of the child created, parental duties and 
obligations to their children and considerations of impersonal harm. However, what, at least in part, 
seems to be the focus of this question, although it is often only alluded to in the literature are the harms 
that certain disabilities have the potential to impose on others.  In light of this, this paper asks a slightly 
different question to the usual one in this area.  It asks: Might prospective parents have a limited moral 
obligation to select against disability in virtue of the person-affecting harms that the creation of 
disabled persons might impose on those other than the child created? 
 
II.  THE SELECTION AGAINST DISABILITY VIEW AND ITS VARIANTS 
Before discussing whether there might be good moral reasons in favour of selecting against genetic 
traits liable to result in disability in our offspring it is important to first define what exactly is meant in 
this paper when it is stated that some particular person is, or will be, disabled. What constitutes 
disability and whether or not it is intrinsic (a result of individual limitation) or extrinsic (a result of the 
responses of others and society) to those who experience it, is heavily contested and countless attempts 
have been made to provide an uncontroversial account. However, for the purposes of this paper, a more 
general and hybridised definition of disability that fits with current societal and legal conceptions of 
disability will suffice. Taking as a basis the definitions of disability provided by the World Health 
Organisation2 and the 2010 Equality Act3 the term disability here refers to the substantial and long term 
negative effects, such as activity limitations and participation restrictions that result from the 
interaction of individuals with physical or mental impairments and other health conditions with their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) defines disability as “an umbrella term covering 
impairments, activity limitations and participation restrictions… a complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between 
features of a persons body [such as impairments and health conditions like cerebral palsy, Down syndrome and depression] and 
features of the society in which he or she lives [such as negative attitudes, inaccessible transportation and public buildings, and 
limited social supports].” For more information see: World Health Organisation, Disability and Health Fact Sheet no. 352, 
available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs352/en/.   
3 According to section 6 (1) of the 2010 Equality Act “A person (P) has a disability if- (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, 
and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P’s ability to carry our normal day-to-day activities.” 
 
	   5	  
environment, and a genetic trait will be referred to as disabling when it is liable to result in the 
existence of a person who fulfils such criteria. 
 
The Selection Against Disability View should be described as encompassing a family of views which 
pick out some or some number of negative characteristics that are perceived to attach to disability (for 
example: limited opportunity or suffering) and hold, in virtue of this association, that, ceteris paribus, 
it is morally preferable to choose to bring to birth a child absent this/these characteristic/s. It is not a 
monistic view and views falling under its umbrella need only exhibit a weak commitment to the belief 
that knowledge of the fact that a fetus/ embryo is in possession of genetic or physical traits liable to 
result in disability constitutes good reason, although that reason may be defeasible, against a decision 
to bring it to birth. Thus, subscription to such a view does not require one to hold that it will always be 
morally wrong to choose to bring to birth a child with a disability, the strongest and least plausible 
version of the Selection Against Disability view, nor, indeed, even for one to subscribe to the view that 
it will normally be morally wrong to fail to do what one can to ensure that one brings to a birth a non-
disabled child, although such views are, of course included within its umbrella. 
 
In this rather general form we can note that the Selection Against Disability view as it is characterised 
here is just vague enough to offer very little guidance as to when selection should be deemed morally 
required, and when a failure to select against disability would, in virtue of competing normative claims, 
be deemed morally acceptable.4 This is so for good reason. For, whilst the above definition and 
explanation captures the general view held by those who subscribe to this view it is the case that 
depending on the variant to which one subscribes and the circumstances in which we find ourselves, 
incredibly different answers will be given to the question of whether it is morally acceptable for person 
(p) to fail to select against disability or to deliberately select for disabling trait ‘x’ in some particular 
scenario (s). This is so as different variants provide different reasons as to why it should be considered 
normatively preferable to select against ‘x’ in one’s offspring, reasons which, unsurprisingly, pick out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Of course, as is the case with any normative claim its prescriptions will tend to adhere the following general rule of thumb; the 
more relevant and weighty competing moral claims to be taken into account, the less likely; and the less competing and weighty 
moral claims, the more likely; a commitment to the selection against disability view - if the reasons behind that commitment are 
defensible - will lead to an obligation to select against disability in a specific situation. Thus, to use a rather crude example it can 
be assumed when applied to different forms of selection that moral reasons in favour of selection against disability will likely 
hold more weight in a scenario where a couple or single reproducer is already undergoing IVF, has no moral objection to the 
discarding of embryos and is, however implausibly, offered PGD in order to select against disability for free than in one where 
fetal abnormality is discovered late in pregnancy where the only option to select against disability is late-term abortion. 
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different elements as providing the wrong-making quality of failing to avoid disability in one’s 
offspring and thus hold different amounts of weight when pitted against competing moral claims such 
as the emotional burdens, physical risks, and financial costs a prospective parent may have to bear in 
order to fulfil its prescriptions. 
 
Arguments that may form the basis of a version of this view can generally be seen as falling into four 
distinct categories focusing on different justifications. The major positions associated with such 
justifications shall now be outlined before moving on to focus on the fourth in order to provide a basis 
for our discussions: 
 
1. Harming and Wronging The Child 
2. Violations of Parental Duties and Virtues 
3. Impersonal Harms  
4. Harms To Others 
 
The first class of argument suggests a duty of disability avoidance can be grounded in the interests 
and/or the rights of the children that will result from our procreative decisions. Arguments falling into 
this category thus focus on person-affecting reasons, picking out the harms or limits to opportunity 
associated with certain disabilities as providing good moral reason to select against traits liable to result 
in such harms and limits to opportunity. Perhaps the most straightforward argument of this type would 
be that as disability is, by definition, a harmful or disadvantageous state for an individual to be in it 
would be better for some/all disabled fetuses/embryos should they not be brought into existence. This 
however, requires one to commit to the claim that the lives of disabled individuals are often dominated 
by suffering and has very few, if any, proponents. For, to say a life is not worth living places a large 
burden of proof on those who make such a claim. As such, it is generally assumed that arguments 
focusing on the harms that disability may impose on our children may legitimately be made, if at all, 
only in cases of extremely serious and/or painful disabilities5. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I note, ‘if at all’ in virtue of the fact that the appropriateness of appeals to a harm threshold in cases of disability avoidance has 
recently been called into question by Anna Smajdor who suggests that such appeals are inappropriate on comparative accounts of 
harm such as that of Feinberg. For an insight into this lively debate see: Smajdor, A 2014 ‘How useful is the concept of the 
‘harm threshold’ in reproductive ethics and law?’ Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (5): 321-336. & Williams, N. J and 
Harris, J 2014. ‘What is the harm in harmful conception? On threshold harms in non-identity cases’, Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 35 (5): pp.  337-351. 
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Others attempt to lessen the threshold level of disability, suggesting a version of the selection against 
disability view may be grounded in the rights of those that may be brought to birth as a result of 
selection decisions. The most famous of such approaches is Davis’ application of Feinberg’s Open 
Future Argument to the prenatal context. She suggests that a decision to implant an embryo that may be 
subject to a genetic disease over a healthy embryo violates the prospective child’s ‘rights in trust’ 
(Davis 1997, 7-15). Such rights are held to be a corollary of the autonomy rights that adults possess in 
liberal societies and require that parents not close off certain important choices their children may wish 
to make when they are adults whilst they are still minors (Feinberg 1992a, 80). 
 
Arguments falling into the second category look to the kinds of role-specific duties that parents owe to 
their children (Hare 2007, Wolf 2009) and the kinds of virtues that a good parent should possess 
(McDougall 2005, 602-603). They focus, like the first, on the harms and limits to opportunity that may 
result from the possession of disabling genetic traits, arguing that a good parent should not want to 
create a child who is likely to be disadvantaged in such a way. This is the case with Steinbock and 
McClamrock’s “principle of parental responsibility” which requires persons to “refrain from having 
children unless certain minimal conditions can be satisfied…[as] loving, concerned parents – will want 
their children to have lives well worth living.” (Steinbock and McClamrock 1994, 17)  
 
Arguments falling into the third category appeal to non-person affecting concerns, such as the effects 
of a failure to select against disability on the state of the world by arguing that the creation of persons 
with disabilities may in some or other way make the world a poorer place. Parfit, Glover and Harris, 
for example, have all famously argued that states of affairs need not be good or bad for anyone in order 
to be morally blameworthy but may instead be good or bad tout court and have applied this reasoning 
to the question of whether there might be a moral obligation to select against disability. They argue that 
those who fail to avoid disability in their offspring act wrongly as they deliberately or negligently 
choose to create a state of affairs that is strictly worse (in terms of some particular value such as 
happiness/preference satisfaction) than the state of affairs that could have been created had they chosen 
differently (Parfit 1984, Glover 2001, Harris 2001). This kind of argument can be seen in Savulescu’s 
Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It states that prospective parents have a duty to “select the child 
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of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life 
as the others, based on the relevant available information” (Savulescu 2001, 415) a duty which, 
although not limited to selection against disability would, in the vast majority of circumstances, require 
such selection. It can also be seen in the eugenics policies of the late 19th and 20th centuries that 
attempted to build a ‘better’ society via the implementation of selective breeding programmes and the 
forced sterilisation of those deemed genetically undesirable.  
 
Finally, the fourth class of reason, like the first, consists of arguments suggesting that a duty of 
disability avoidance may be grounded in the person-affecting harms liable to result from a failure to 
select against disability. Unlike the first class however, variants falling into this category should be 
seen to focus outwardly on the harms – financial, emotional, relational and otherwise – that a decision 
to select for/not to select against disability may impose on persons already in existence, that is, on 
individuals other than the fetus itself6. 
 
In recent years, much attention has been given to the first three of the above classes of reason. Both 
those who champion and criticise a version of the selection against disability view have written 
extensively on such matters, as, indeed, have the many authors who have written papers offering both 
in depth and surface surveys of different incarnations of this debate7. Yet, despite this, arguments 
falling into the fourth category have been largely neglected8 in the literature. Why this has been the 
case, however, is mysterious and this is so for two reasons: 
 
Firstly, as there is a general tendency within society and philosophy to question the moral acceptability 
of acts including but not limited to choices to engage in extreme and dangerous sports, go on exotic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Although it is acknowledged here that some may view that the fetus should be counted among persons already in existence and 
thus included in calculations of harm and benefit in these scenarios, this paper holds, in line with psychological accounts of 
personal identity over time and sentience and personhood based criteria for moral status, that the fetus/embryo is not an entity of 
a kind whose interests may be affected by acts of selection. This is so as whilst the interests of a fetus in the 2nd or third trimester 
may be affected by acts which cause it harm, the fetus/embryo, in lacking both the capacities required for an interest in avoiding 
death and for psychological connectedness to the person it’s organism could become, is not an appropriate subject for inclusion 
in a harm-benefit analysis.  
7 A fantastic survey of arguments supporting disability avoidance can be found in Kyle. W. Anstey. 2008. 'A Critique of 
Arguments Supporting Disability Avoidance ', Disability and Society, no. 23(3): 235-46.  An equally useful survey of the 
selection for disability debate can be found in Melissa. S. Fahmy. 2011 'On the Supposed Moral Harm of Selecting for Deafness', 
Bioethics, no. 25(3) (2011): 128-136.  
8 I note that this is largely the case as opposed to wholly so in virtue of the fact that a small number of philosophers have 
attempted to justify a version of the selection against disability view by consideration of such harms. The most notable of such 
attempts can be found in Thomas. Douglas and Katrien. Devolder. 2013.  'Procreative Altruism: Beyond Individualism in 
Reproductive Selection', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, no. 38: 400-19; Jacob.  Elster. 2011. 'Procreative Beneficence - 
Cui Bono', Bioethics, no. 25(9): 482-88; Melinda. A. Roberts. 2009. 'What Is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to 
Choice to Harms to Persons', Law and Philosophy, no. 28(1):1-57. 
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holidays, smoke, or eat unhealthily from the perspective of analysis of the externalities such choices 
produce it seems bizarre that acts of procreation should be immune from criticism on the same 
grounds. Secondly, it should also be noted that it is now generally held that arguments focusing on 
harms to the child fail to provide a defensible moral foundation for the selection against disability view 
in all but the most severe cases of disability, in virtue of the conclusions of the non-identity problem. 
Thus, most theorists have only two welfarist options when it comes to possibilities for a moral 
grounding for such a subscription: appeals to impersonal harms and harms to others. That impersonal 
harms have received more attention than those affecting actual persons thus constitutes the second 
mystery. For, even if impersonal harms are possible and relevant when determining the moral status of 
our actions, acts causing harm to actual persons are generally held to be of more moral gravity than 
those causing impersonal harms. As such, if a failure to select against disability can be shown to cause 
unjustifiable harms to actual persons, it may be the case that such harms can provide a stronger moral 
basis for a duty of disability avoidance.    
 
With this in mind, and taking as a basis a comparative account of harm as setbacks to interests – 
according to which it is held, that some particular entity (p) is harmed by some particular action (x) 
when it is the case that x has adversely affected the interests of p, or counterfactually, when it is the 
case that the interests of p are, all things considered, in a worse condition than they would have been 
had x not occurred (Feinberg 1992b, 7) – I gradually widen the area of concern from which I analyse 
the real or perceived harms that a failure to select against disability have the potential to impose on 
others.  
 
Where such harms are found I then ask whether they might be deemed wrongful, providing a 
defensible moral foundation for a version of the selection against disability view. I thus begin by 
looking to the harms that prospective parents might be said to impose upon themselves by a failure to 
select against disability. The focus is then widened slightly to include family members whose interests 
might be negatively affected by such a decision. Finally, after this is done, I widen the focus to its 
furthest reach, looking to the idea that a failure to select against disability may cause unjustifiable harm 
to our fellow citizens in virtue of the moral claims that such decisions impose upon them regarding the 
proper and just division of social resources.  
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III.  Personal Harms: Autonomy and The Costs of Procreation 
 
Whatever the reasons we have for reproducing very few of us do so because we believe that in 
procreating we will benefit our future children. Nor, indeed, do any but the most collective-minded of 
us decide to reproduce for the reason that we believe our child’s existence will provide some benefit to 
humanity. Instead, our decisions to do so tend to be based in considerations of self-interest, individual 
perceptions of obligation, or a-rational in nature, undertaken with no specific purpose in mind but 
unthinkingly and perhaps out of a sense of inevitability.   
 
 We may, for example, believe that in undertaking the project of parenthood we will be better off, that 
we might find love, fulfilment, companionship or a sense of purpose, that a child might provide the 
antidote to an ailing marriage, or provide us with security and support in our senescence. We may 
instead, or in addition, view that there is an obligation on our part to continue the family line or name, 
to provide our partners or parents with children, believe that parenthood is socially or culturally 
required, or perceive a religious obligation to ‘be fruitful and multiply.’ We may too find that 
reproduction is not really a ‘choice’ at all, because we find ourselves pregnant and/or in possession of 
beliefs that tie our hands or because we have been conditioned to think that to have a child is, in some 
sense, inevitable, not required as such, but a natural part of human life that we tend not to fail to avoid 
except upon significant motivation.  
 
For the self-interested among us, who procreate not merely out of a sense of obligation or a-rationally, 
it can be noted that decisions to do so tend to be based on a belief that in accordance with the 
information we have available, we will be better off should we conceive/give birth to/raise a child, or 
will, at the very least, not be caused harm by our decision on balance. Thus, we accept (implicitly or 
explicitly) the costs of parenthood, such as the time, money and effort that it takes to rear a child, in 
anticipation that the benefits we seek will outweigh such costs. Yet, despite this, in certain scenarios, a 
decision to bring some particular child to birth may leave us worse-off than we would have been had 
we chosen differently and to make such a decision, when in full knowledge of this fact will be one that 
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cannot be considered rational if we are seeking to act self-interestedly. As such, it may be possible to 
claim that in cases where a reproductive choice (including but not limited to a decision not to select 
against disability) will leave prospective parents worse off than they would have been had they made a 
different choice such individuals might well wrong themselves. 
 
 Whether or not such a claim can be made, however, is determined, at least in main, by our responses to 
two questions. The first of these regards what we view to constitute the components of an autonomous 
decision. The second concerns our ability to both predict and rank different possible states of affairs 
relating to the choice of whether or not to select against disability, such that we may show the life of 
some individual is liable to be worse, as opposed to merely different, as a result of their choice.   
 
Regarding the first question, if it is held along broadly Millian lines that it is the possession of certain 
capacities (such as reason, reflection and representational abilities) as opposed to their exercise that is 
required for autonomous choice, that a decision is irrational provides no reason to claim that those who 
make irrational choices either wrong themselves or may be wronged by others who fail to stop them 
from acting irrationally. Provided an individual possesses such capacities, is not being coerced by 
others, and is in possession of the information required to make an autonomous decision, he may just 
as easily choose to cause himself harm as he may to furnishing himself with benefits. This is so as if 
the moral agent in such cases is the same as the moral subject, the idea that he might act wrongly by 
harming himself constitutes a contradiction. For, the moral subject, in his position as moral agent with 
the capacity to release others of their moral obligations to him, has the capacity too to release himself 
from his own. 
 
On other accounts however, such as in the position taken by Kant regarding the possibility of duties to 
self, this contradiction does not occur. On this account persons are dualised entities, the homo 
noumenon, a perfectly rational legislator, and the homo phaenomenon, a finite and imperfect being 
who, by possessing the capacity of free will may both obey the law of the former and fail to obey it. 
Such entities thus stand together, creating a state of dialectical opposition between the demands of duty 
and the pull of inclination (Kant, MM 6:418-420). On such an approach while one can, as the latter 
entity, make an autonomous choice and consent to doing the irrational: one cannot as the former in 
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virtue of the fact that the perfectly rational legislator cannot consent to the irrational. One can, by 
acting only as the latter entity and ignoring the prescriptions of the prior, wrong oneself, just as one can 
wrong others, by failing to act in accordance with duty. As such, those who subscribe to this view may 
claim that in situations where one has a choice between a rational and an irrational procreative 
decision, to choose to act irrationally will constitute a moral wrong.  
 
One need not, however, subscribe to the Kantian account to locate the wrong of an irrational 
procreative decision in the harms that a procreative decision-maker may impose on himself. On other  
‘thick’ accounts of autonomy, for example, we may claim that the individual who ‘chooses’ to act 
irrationally actually makes no choice at all as an autonomous choice is a rational one. Irrational choices 
are necessarily inauthentic in the sense that the decision maker either lacks the information sufficient to 
make the ‘right’ (rational) decision, or his capacity to understand that information has been 
compromised. Thus, although an agent will not wrong himself, others might well be said to wrong him 
by failing to intervene and stop him from harming himself in such scenarios.  
 
Should we adopt such an approach however, this may still not justify the outward imposition on those 
who would make such decisions of a moral duty to act in a rational manner. For, whilst paternalistic 
attempts to save individuals from themselves may have their place in the writings of Rousseau (1997 
SC:1) and Plato (1993) they are at odds with the insistence common to most, if not all mainstream 
ethical theories including that of Kant himself, that we should aim to preserve and enlarge the arena of 
his life over which the individual can be said to be sovereign. In accordance with this commitment it is 
held that ceteris paribus individuals should be given the freedom – both morally and politically – to 
make their own decisions regarding how to live their lives, regardless of how foolish others may view 
such decisions to be (Mill 1989, Kant 2005). Indeed, oppressive moral, social and political 
environments have proven themselves, time and again throughout history, not to be particularly 
conducive to individual wellbeing. Individuals are, after-all, normally in a better place to judge the 
extent to which their decisions might cause them harms and benefits than those who lack the access 
they have to their own mental states (such as their beliefs, desires and emotions). Indeed, even where 
this is not so it can be noted that they tend to give special weight to decisions they make themselves: 
gaining more pleasure and pride from their own successes and accepting more readily the harms they 
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impose upon themselves than those imposed from the outside.  
 
However, although it can be claimed on certain accounts of autonomy that those who harm themselves 
act wrongly or may be wronged by our allowing them to do so, it is yet to be demonstrated that those 
who choose not to select against disability in their offspring are actually liable to be made worse-off 
than they would have been had they chosen differently. Whether or not this will be the case can, of 
course, only be predicted, due to the fact that certain knowledge of the future is impossible. Indeed, 
neither is a positive judgement of wrong in one specific case always likely to lead to a positive 
judgement in another. For, our ability to make such a judgement is greatly dependent on a large 
number of factors that may interact with one another in a number of ways such as the nature and 
severity of the disability in question; the identity of the prospective parents and the harms they may 
suffer as a result of selection; as well as the structure of the society in which the child will be raised etc. 
 In favour of this judgement it can be noted that it has been well documented that raising a child with a 
disability often proves more costly for parents than raising a child who is not disabled. Economically 
speaking, on top of the normal costs associated with raising a child, depending on the nature and 
severity of the disability parents may need to make significant adjustments to their homes. They may 
need to purchase special equipment, adapted specialist toys, food and medicines.  One or both parents 
may need to stay at home to care for the child which will lower their earning potential and mean they 
have less financial resources to satisfy their own interests. (Dobson and Middleton 1998) Emotionally 
and socially too, the stress of dealing with these financial costs may take a toll on their relationships; 
without adequate support from others they may feel isolated; and the pain of seeing their child struggle 
with the mastering of tasks that come easily to other children or watching them suffer from the painful 
effects of certain disabilities may also prove detrimental to their welfare.  
Yet, despite the fact that empirical evidence shows that there are often extra costs associated with the 
raising of children with certain disabilities it is still to be demonstrated that such costs are not likely to 
be outweighed by compensating benefits. In the case of persons who wish to select for disability in 
their offspring, for example, this seems, for obvious reasons, to be untrue. Such individuals, in making 
a concerted effort to create a child with a particular set of genetic characteristics tend to express a belief 
that raising such a child will, for them be just as, if not more, fulfilling, worthwhile or enjoyable than 
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raising a child without the particular characteristics they seek.  
Even in cases of severe and un-chosen disabilities, that the birth of a disabled child is likely to prove 
harmful on balance or, in a stronger sense, produce a less favourable ratio of benefit to burden for his 
parents is highly questionable. It may, for example be claimed that in comparing and ranking as better 
or worse the possible states of affairs resulting from a decision whether or not to select against 
disability we are erroneously assuming that such states of affairs are commensurable when, in fact, 
they are not. It may be claimed, for example that just as the concept of the good life is too rich and 
complex to allow that one life may be determined better than another by reference only to the benefits 
and burdens it contained, it is impossible too to rank the states of affairs resulting from a selection 
decision on this basis. Indeed, even if such an argument is found unconvincing, a review undertaken of 
studies regarding the impact on family life of parenting a child with a severe disability notes that 
despite such costs the lives of parents of children with disabilities tend to resemble the lives of parents 
generally (Ferguson, Gartner, and Lipsky 2000, 73).  Indeed, another study comparing child related and 
parenting stress in parents of children with and without disabilities notes that parents of disabled 
children “exhibit variability comparable to the general population with respect to important outcomes 
such as parental stress… family functioning… and marital satisfaction” (Krauss 1993, 393-404). In 
other words, whilst parenting a child with a disability might pose certain challenges – especially in 
terms of finances – as society tends not to provide the conditions conducive to the trouble free rearing 
of severely disabled children (Kittay 2000, 167), the act of parenting a child with a disability seems, to 
be no more or less likely to be fulfilling, unfulfilling, stressful, enjoyable, damaging to one’s 
relationships or difficult for parents on balance than parenting a non-disabled child. 
Finally, dependent on the timing and method of selection, the act of selection against disability has the 
potential, just as might the raising of a child with a disability, to impose great harms on prospective 
parents.  Thus, a decision to choose not to select against disability even in the face of great burdens may 
well, for some, prove to be the least harmful option available to them. Regarding abortion after the 
discovery of fetal abnormality, for example, for those who subscribe to a pro-life view, feelings of guilt 
and shame might be overwhelmingly strong and thus override any benefit that may be produced by 
procuring an abortion. Indeed, even where this is not the case, it should be noted too that gestation 
involves a great deal of intimacy between the fetus and the mother. For, as has been noted by Anstey; 
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“Gestated entities are strongly incorporated into the mother’s body and especially subject to bonding 
relationships” (Anstey 2008, 237). As such, the decision to abort a fetus after a diagnosis of a genetic or 
developmental abnormality, may be one that would cause a great deal of lasting psychological pain, which 
could, dependent upon its intensity, outweigh the benefits the performance of an abortion would produce.  
 
IV.  Selection Against Disability and the Just Distribution of Familial Resources 
Attempts to ground a version of the selection against disability view in the harms that raising a child 
with a disability may impose upon parents themselves seem, for the reasons outlined above, to be 
unlikely to succeed. However, although parents may be said, in the vast majority of cases, to accept the 
harms and benefits they impose on themselves by their procreative choices, reproductive decisions, like 
all others, do not take place in a vacuum.  They affect, for better or worse, not just ourselves and the 
objects of our procreative efforts, but virtually all members of society, producing harms and benefits, 
which regardless of whether we intend them or not, will be relevant for determining the moral status of 
any particular procreative act. 
 
The idea that others might be harmed to the extent that a decision not to select against disability might 
actually constitute a wrong seems most likely to hold in situations where our existing dependants may 
be negatively affected by our choices. For, we often view that we owe special moral obligations to 
family members that extend beyond our obligations to strangers and even where this is not the case can 
note too that family members, in virtue of their close proximity to us and our choices, are more likely 
than others to be significantly affected by them. A case might thus be made for a moral duty to select 
against disability in situations where a decision not to do so would be made by those with existing 
children, or who have taken on responsibility for ensuring the welfare of dependent adults. For, whilst 
the addition of a new member to a family will, in most cases, affect the interests of existing members 
as both familial resources and the time and attention spent satisfying and nurturing the interests of 
existing dependents will have to be spread more thinly, when the new member of a family suffers from 
a disability such issues may be compounded. Disability costs and parents bear a significant proportion 
of these costs even in societies such as our own where certain of the costs associated with child rearing 
and disability are socialised. As such, these costs will, if prospective parents have any, affect their 
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existing dependents. The needs of an infant with a disability may be far greater than the needs of one 
without and may sometimes not reduce as the infant becomes a child and that child becomes an adult. 
This means that in such circumstances the needs of one’s other children will often be addressed only 
after the needs of the child who is disabled.   
 
This is not, in itself, necessarily morally problematic. For, provided we hold that familial resources 
should properly be diverted to those with the most need for them it will be the case that to take one’s 
eldest child to ballet lessons, to save money for her university years, or to help her with her homework, 
although good things to do, must come second to ensuring that the safety and basic needs of one’s 
other dependents are met.  This view is illustrated well by Nagel in the following example: 
Suppose I have two children, one of which is normal and quite happy and the other of which 
suffers from a painful handicap… I am about to change jobs. Suppose I must decide between 
moving to an expensive city where the second child can receive special medical treatment and 
schooling, but where the family’s standards of living will be lower and the neighbourhood 
will be unpleasant and dangerous for the first child-or else moving to a pleasant semi-rural 
suburb where the first child, who has a special interest in sports and nature can have a free and 
agreeable life (Nagel 1978, 22). 
 
Nagel argues that in this case even if the benefits of moving to the semi-rural suburb for the first child 
will be far greater than the benefits that the second child will receive by a choice to move to the city it 
will be the case that as the needs of the second child are more urgent he should still choose to move to 
the city. Provided the welfare of the first child does not fall below some threshold level such that he 
would be made worse off than the second child by the move, or the benefits accrued by the second 
child are so minimal that they are virtually non-existent, a decision to place the interests of the second 
child over those of the first child will be morally required (Nagel 1978, 23-24). 
 
Yet, in spite of this, some such as Roberts have noted that whether or not we view that parents should 
properly distribute benefits and burdens unequally between their offspring when one is disabled and the 
other is not, is irrelevant. For, she notes in reference to a case similar to Nagel’s where an existing 
sibling is expected to make sacrifices for the welfare of one who is disabled, differing only in the sense 
that the parents make a conscious decision to bring to birth a child with severely disabling genetic 
characteristics: 
That the parents, having chosen to produce the impaired child, then make the further choice to 
distribute wellbeing appropriately between that child and others–and hence, not to 
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unjustifiably harm those others by that further choice–does not imply that the harm imposed 
by the original choice can itself be justified. There are two distinct choices-and two distinct 
distributive effects (Roberts 2009, 22). 
 
Put more simply, the claim Roberts makes is that in cases such as that above the choice to bring a child 
who will be severely disabled into the world is that which is under scrutiny, not how to distribute 
resources or welfare within a family once that decision has been made. Roberts thus argues that when 
we assess the rightness or wrongness of a particular procreative choice we must compare “(1) the 
effects of that choice on each person, against (2) the effects of each alternative choice, including those 
that exclude bringing [the impaired child] into existence” (Roberts 2009, 29). This leads her to suggest 
that in cases when prospective parents choose to bring into existence a child with a serious disability 
which will impact on their ability to create wellbeing, opportunity etc. for an existing dependent such a 
decision will constitute a harm for him. For, regardless of whether the parents can be said to distribute 
wellbeing and other resources appropriately between him and his sibling once born, it is still the case 
that he can claim that he would have been better off had they chosen differently.    
 
Putting aside the epistemic questions which surround cases such as the one Roberts envisages - 
concerning when and whether it will be possible in reality to predict with accuracy that a particular 
reproductive choice is likely to result in harm to an existing child - whether or not harms to existing 
dependents where they can be predicted will constitute a wrong depends greatly on what moral 
obligations parents have towards their offspring. For, although “parents who decide to bring a child 
into the world have special duties to that child because, in deciding to procreate, they take upon 
themselves responsibility for this child's well-being and development” (Blustein 1992, 228) there are 
many competing accounts of the kinds and extent of obligations they consent to take on.  
 
Do those who take on the role of parent, for example, have a moral duty to always do the best for their 
children, to act in their best interests regardless of the sacrifices they themselves must make? If such is 
the case it would seem that in cases where prospective parents have existing dependents, a decision to 
bring to birth a child with a disability is one that should be made very carefully as it has the potential, 
in many circumstances to constitute a moral wrong. Yet, on such a strong account of parental 
obligation it would seem that parents are constantly at risk of unjustifiably harming their children by 
their choices, reproductive or otherwise. Thus, in the case of reproductive choices, just as we might 
ground a moral obligation to select against disability in the interests of existing children, so too might 
we ground an obligation to have or not to have additional children, disabled or not, in such interests if 
it can be shown, for example, that only children will tend to be worse or better off than children with 
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siblings. Indeed, just as the sibling of a child with a disability may be more likely to feel ignored or 
neglected by his parents than siblings of children without disability, the same could be said of siblings 
of gifted children. For, studies have revealed that relations between non-gifted and gifted children are 
less intimate than those between non-gifted siblings and often characterised by jealousy and resentment 
of their gifted sibling’s ‘arrogance’ and intellectual abilities (Lapidot-Berman & Oshrat 2009, 36). In 
cases not related to reproduction, it can be noted that such a strong account of parental obligation might 
require loving but poor parents to hand their children over to equally loving and wealthy adopters if 
such persons are in a better position to care for them, and that the parents of incredibly intellectually 
gifted children might unjustifiably harm them by failing to mortgage their homes in order to provide an 
exclusive and incredibly expensive education.  
 
Indeed, any decision that parents make, taken with their own, or the interests of others, as opposed to 
their child’s, in mind would seem to be vulnerable to moral criticism, as the parents would be, in virtue 
of their role, morally responsible for any and all decisions with less than optimal results for their child. 
Similar problems seem to plague Feinberg’s account of parental obligation, which requires parents 
send their children out into the world “with as many open opportunities as possible, thus maximising 
[their] chances for self-fulfilment” (Feinberg 1992a, 84). With this in mind it is suggested that a 
defensible account of parental obligation must take both a weaker and more complicated form than the 
requirement to always act in the best interests of one’s children, or to furnish them with maximally 
open futures. Such an account should take into account the interests of parents themselves but should 
also and importantly prove compatible with the moral claims of other members of society.  
 
The extent of parental obligation however, still differs greatly on different accounts. Some, for 
example, suggest only that parents satisfy their children’s basic needs or that their children reach some 
minimum threshold level of wellbeing. Others hold that parents must do what they can to ensure that 
their children have good lives and others still make less concrete claims regarding a parental obligation 
to ‘love’ or to exhibit a kind of “natural affection” (Hume 1978, 478) that requires personal sacrifice 
and must be sustained even in the face of difficulties that might destroy most relationships.  
 
	   19	  
On the most minimal conception of parental obligation we can note that parents will be required merely 
to satisfy their children’s basic needs for food, shelter, education, clothing and comfort until their child 
is able to satisfy such needs herself and that any other benefits they may choose to bestow on their 
child should be seen as supererogatory. On this account unless a parental decision will, in some way or 
other cause parents to be unable to meet these basic needs, their choices would be deemed irrelevant, 
morally speaking, in respect to their role. Provided a decision to have another child, disabled or not, 
will not impact negatively on parental ability and willingness to attend to such needs, that one’s 
existing child may claim “I would have been better off had you not acted in the way you did” will not 
constitute a valid moral complaint and will therefore not provide moral reason to select against 
disability. 
 
Indeed, even on the more substantial accounts noted above where parental obligations extend to loving 
and forwarding certain of their children’s less basic interests we should note that the comparative 
harms prospective parents may impose upon them by a decision not to select against disability may 
well be quite high. Requiring parents to do their best to ensure their child has a good life, is after-all, 
far less demanding than a requirement that we ensure she have the best life available to her and so too 
is the demand that a parent exhibit a kind of sacrificial love when making decisions that impact upon 
their children. 
 
Indeed, it should be noted too that cases such as those Roberts mentions - where it can be predicted 
quite accurately prior to birth that a decision to bring to birth a child with a disability will impact 
negatively on the interests of an existing dependent – are likely to be far fewer in number than might be 
assumed. For, in cases of less severe disabilities and conditions such as Down Syndrome which can 
come in both mild and severe forms, it may be virtually impossible to predict with accuracy the extent 
to which existing family members will be negatively effected by a choice not to select against disability 
and that in many cases it will, with careful planning, be possible for prospective parents to meet the 
needs of both disabled and non-disabled offspring adequately. Further, just as the siblings and other 
family members are liable to bear the brunt of the negative effects of disability in virtue of their close 
proximity so too are they best placed to receive the benefits that may come from a close relationship 
with a person with a disability such as growth into a kind, mature tolerant and considerate member of 
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society who is able to see the value in a wide range of different modes of life (Powell & Ogle 1985). 
As such, whilst it can be argued that parents should take into account the sacrifices their existing 
dependents may have to make in order to satisfy the needs of an additional family member with a 
disability, such sacrifices are highly unlikely - even in cases of the most serious disabilities and where 
selection is unlikely to prove harmful to prospective parents such as where prospective parents are 




V.  Societal Resources and The Demands of Justice 
In the previous section the kinds of harms existing dependents might face as a result of a parental 
decision not to select against disability were explored. It was noted that, unless we are to subscribe to a 
remarkably strong account of parental obligation, the kinds of harms to interests that siblings may face 
as a result of a decision not to select against disability will often be justifiable. For, although parents 
undoubtedly have obligations to furnish their children with certain goods, the goods existing children 
are liable to be denied by such decisions will tend not to be of a kind we generally deem parents 
morally required to provide. Despite this however, there is another, more widely applicable sense in 
which a decision not to select against disability in one’s offspring might be said to impose unjustifiable 
harms on others in certain situations. For, dependent on the social structures of the society in which we 
live and the extent to which they can be said to embody socialist/egalitarian as opposed to libertarian 
ideals, as well as the nature of the particular disability with which we are concerned, a parental choice 
not to select against disability has the potential to impose (rightly or wrongly) substantial costs on 
existing members of society. 
V. I. Distributive Justice and Reproductive Choices 
In societies with advanced socialised medical and welfare systems, the decision to procreate and rear 
any child is one that is expensive for both parents and other members of society. Indeed, it only 
increases in expense the closer our society comes to embodying egalitarian ideals and the greater the 
inequities that may be faced by our children. This is so as “virtually everything that goes into the 
production of us, following conception is something supplied by our parents or by people elected or 
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employed for that purpose. They… supply us with our pre-natal environment, our medical care, our 
schooling… and all the rest of it” (Steiner 2002, 186). Yet, although it is generally thought that the 
provision of public resources to assist parents in child-rearing and to level-out or compensate for the 
inequities their children may face is morally required, it is in fact far from clear that those who make a 
decision to reproduce have an enforceable right to demand that others share in the costs associated with 
their choice. For, just as in the case of procreative decisions and the just division of familial resources, 
whether we view that a certain basket of social resources must be provided to a child once born 
actually has little bearing on the question of whether and when prospective parents are morally justified 
in imposing this burden of support on other members of society.  
Whilst historically theorists of distributive justice have tended to say very little about who should bear 
the costs of child-rearing, only that such costs must be met by someone, the idea that parents may act 
wrongly by reproducing when they are unable or unwilling to provide their children with the basket of 
resources required to satisfy their claims to justice has in more recent years9 been explored in some 
depth by a number of prominent scholars.10 Some have provided compelling arguments that parents 
should, in a truly just society, be held responsible for meeting the costs of any claims to justice that 
their children might have as a result of their voluntary actions due to the fact of their voluntariness. 
Rakowski, for example, notes provocatively: 
“If children were purely accidents of nature, entering the world independent of anyone’s 
choices, one could understand why everyone alive would share a duty to care for them. But 
children are never accidents in this sense… Because specific people are responsible for their 
existence and needs, parents alone should bear the cost of compensating their children for any 
cost they suffer genetically or otherwise. The community may serve as a backstop should 
parents default on their obligation, but it should not be the principal payor” (Rakowski 2002, 
1365-1366). 
In most cases however, a decision to provide societal support to parents in the upbringing of their 
children and in meeting the claims to justice of such children whilst they are children and once they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 During, for example, the discussions surrounding zero-population growth in the 1960’s and 70’s and the debates regarding 
questions of parental justice which raged during the 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
10 See for example: Paula. Casal and Andrew. Williams. 1995. 'Rights, Equality and Procreation', Analyse & Kritik, no. 17: 93-
116; Nancy. Folbre. 1994. 'Children as Public Goods', American Economic Review, no. 84: 86-90; Rolf.  George. 1987.  'Who 
Should Bear the Costs of Children?', Public Affairs Quarterly, no. 1: 1-42; Serena. Olsaretti. 2013. 'Children as Public Goods', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, no. 41(3): 226-258; Eric. Rakowski. 1991. Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon; Eric. Rakowski. 
2002. 'Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?'. California Law Review. no. 90(5): 1345-1414; Peter. Vallentyne. 2002. 'Equality and 
the Duties of Procreators'. In: The Moral and Political Status of Children  (pp.195-211), David. Archard and Colin. M. Macleod 
(eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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reach majority can be justified by appeals to self-interest and where this is not the case, by appeals to 
the non-ideal conditions under which procreation tends to take place. 
 
In terms of self-interest, for example, it can be noted that although individuals tend not to ask for 
permission to reproduce this will not often be morally problematic as reproduction generally produces 
a positive as opposed to negative externality. Children do not remain children forever and constitute 
“the future workforce and taxpayers whose economic contributions everyone, nonparents included, will 
depend on when they reach old age” (George 1987, 31).  Existing citizens have an interest in investing 
in the production of healthy, productive and well-educated citizens as in doing so they will likely 
increase the stock of resources available for distribution to themselves. Indeed, as most of us accept the 
benefits created by the production and rearing of children it may be said that there is a moral 
imperative to share in the costs involved in their production. This argument has its basis in the principle 
of fairness/fair play which requires that “if some people engage in a cost-incurring, benefits-producing 
cooperative scheme it is unfair to free ride on them, and thus that those who accept the benefits 
resulting from procreative decisions, have an obligation too to do their fair share in maintaining, or 
bearing the costs of maintaining, the scheme” (Olsaretti 2013, 238). There are good pragmatic reasons 
to adhere to the prescriptions of the principle of fairness too. For, although reproduction produces 
seemingly non-excludable goods and thus it could be argued that it is in the interests of existing 
members of society to free ride on reproductive and parental labour, to do so may jeopardise the 
production of such goods, creating a version of the tragedy of the commons, or threaten their 
privatisation. 
 
Indeed, where self-interested reasons do not apply, there exist other reasons to provide societal 
resources to support those who desire to procreate and who would be unable to meet all of the costs 
associated with their decision without such assistance. Firstly, we can note that notwithstanding the fact 
that reproduction can hardly be classified as a basic need- we can survive without children but not 
food, water and shelter and are able to “form, to revise and to rationally pursue… what we regard for 
us as a worthwhile human life” (Rawls 1996, p. 302) absent the former but not the latter – an interest in 
bearing and rearing children is not exactly trivial either. Even if we deny the credibility of accounts of 
a biological ‘need’ to reproduce, strong social and cultural pro-natal messages most definitely 
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contribute to a psychological need and thus to the distress, depression, and feelings of bereavement 
often experienced by those unable to do so (Lechner, Bolman, and van Dalen 2007) whether the 
reasons for this inability are somatic or social in nature. Thus, if as a society, we are able to 
accommodate this need, preventing the suffering of those who wish to reproduce but would be unable 
to do so without our help, and such accommodations do not prove prohibitively expensive or deny the 
satisfaction of the more pressing interests of others there is good moral reason to do so. Secondly, the 
ability of individuals to bear the costs of producing and raising children is often determined in great 
part by factors over which they have little control. Luck is a pervasive component of human existence 
and as such, dependent on the theory of justice to which we subscribe, those who have done well in the 
natural and social lotteries may well be morally required to subsidise the ambitions, both procreative 
and otherwise, of those whose starting positions in society were less fortuitous. This would mean, for 
example, that the unlucky11 should be afforded the same opportunities to procreate as the lucky12 where 
their inability to satisfy the claims to justice of their children are, to a significant extent, the result of 
poor luck as opposed to considered choices.   
Yet, despite this it does not necessarily follow that such reasons will apply in all cases of reproduction. 
Pragmatically, for example, it can be noted that there seem to be few good reasons for existing 
members of society to contribute to the costs of the production and rearing of children who are highly 
likely to “have initial life prospects that are sufficiently low (for example, below average) that others 
will suffer either increased [justice] demands (to help the offspring) or reduced…entitlements (because 
the offspring displace them)” (Vallentyne 2002, 205). For, such increased demands are likely to lead to 
“diminished per capita resource availability in the short term but also greater depletion of non-
renewable resources in the long-run” (Casal and Williams 2004, 100) and/or other negative effects 
when such effects are not outweighed by the production of other benefits or justified by the claims to 
justice of reproducers. 
 In many cases, of course, we are unable to determine whether a decision to reproduce is likely to 
diminish or forward the welfare and resource holdings of others. As such it might be argued that as this 
is the case there are good pragmatic reasons to pool risk and bear the costs collectively in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Those, for example, who are born into situations of poverty, who lack educational opportunities, who are discriminated against 
on the basis of characteristics beyond their control, or who lack marketable talents etc. 
12 Those, for example, who are born into rich nations and families, who possess numerous valued natural talents and capacities 
and have been given the opportunities to develop them and who are well educated etc.  
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preserve a scheme that is, on balance, to our benefit. Yet, in other cases, informed predictions can be 
made based on the information available to us. A decision to have a child (or many children) in a time 
of famine or when overpopulation threatens and resources are already stretched beyond reasonable 
limits, for example, is always likely to be one that produces a negative externality. Thus can be argued 
that in such cases there might be a duty not to knowingly disadvantage others by our procreative 
decisions.  
Since the advent of genetic testing technologies it seems that the same reasoning may well apply in 
certain cases where reproductive choices are liable to result in the birth of a child who will require 
costly accommodations or expensive medical treatments in order to fully participate in society, or who 
is unlikely to be able to participate at all.  In many cases of reproduction, the birth of a child with a 
disability should be seen as the result of poor brute luck such as when a woman at average or low risk 
of producing a child with a disability discovers an unexpected genetic abnormality in a fetus, where she 
unknowingly comes into contact with a teratogenic substance during pregnancy, or where 
complications during pregnancy and birth result in the birth of a child with a disability. Yet, in others – 
where a couple or single reproducer selects for disability in their offspring (such as in the case of 
Duchesneau and McCullough), fails to take reasonable precautions during pregnancy to avoid exposure 
to situations and substances that may cause disability in their offspring, or makes a conscious decision 
not to avail themselves of services and technologies that will reduce the likelihood of producing 
children with disabilities when to do so would not impose substantial or unreasonable costs on them  –  
there does seem to be an important sense in which the disability and its costs for others are chosen. A 
sense that although not lessening the claim to compensation on the part of the child created – she is not 
responsible for her coming into existence and is just as entitled to a certain and already agreed upon 
level of welfare, opportunity, resources as any other member of a given society – may well, at least on 
desert sensitive accounts of the demands of justice, shift some of the responsibility for bearing such 
costs onto those responsible for her existence. Thus, in cases where such costs cannot or will not be 
borne by reproducers13, those members of society left to foot the bill may well complain that in these 
cases parents may be charged with unjustly “exploiting public resources that were not designed for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The terms cannot or will not are used here in order to acknowledge that arguments which attempt to ground an obligation to 
select against disability in order to avoid the imposition of significant and unnecessary costs on others must necessarily be 
limited in their application only to those who are unable or unwilling to absorb the extra costs associated with a choice not to do 
so.  
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purpose of accommodating unique procreative preferences” (Fahmy 2011, 6) and in cases where such 
resources are finite seem to display a complete lack of concern for other members of society who 
would, had a different decision been made, be entitled to their use.   
V.II.  Do persons with disabilities actually ‘cost more’? Does this matter?  
Whether or not the above argument will succeed in providing prospective parents with good moral 
reason to select against disability in their offspring in situations where they have a choice depends, 
however, on our providing a positive response to two questions. 
The first of these is empirical in nature: Is a choice not to select against disability or to deliberately 
select for disability in this particular case likely to produce an all things considered burden of support 
on existing members of society that will not be justified by appeals to the claims to justice of the 
parents themselves? This question is ideally one for economists to answer as opposed to philosophers. 
However, whilst such is the case, the claims to justice of persons with disabilities do seem generally to 
cost more to meet than the claims of those without disabilities. 
It can be noted, for example, that whilst surveys regarding the financial costs of disability for families 
and society are rarely undertaken, in the UK parents of children classed as ‘seriously disabled’ spend, 
on average, double that spent by parents of children without disabilities on living expenses excluding 
food (Dobson, Middleton, and Beardsworth 2001, 36) and that the annual cost to parents of ensuring 
that the minimum essential needs of a child with a disability is met was estimated in both 1998 and 
2012 to be closer to around three times higher (Dobson and Middleton 1998, 1). Thus, as it is the case 
too that double the proportion of parents of children with disabilities are not in paid employment or 
only in part time employment compared to parents of children without disabilities (Emerson and 
Hatton 2005), find it difficult to sustain paid employment (Dobson, Middleton, and Beardsworth 2001, 
6), and tend to command far fewer resources than those with children without disabilities (Smyth and 
Robus 1989), these added costs will often be paid for by the welfare benefits they and their children 
receive. Similarly, although there are no studies available in the UK comparing the costs of educating 
children with special educational needs and disabilities with the costs of educating those without, the 
government estimates that is costs around 7-9 times more to educate a student in a specialist school 
than it costs, on average, to educate a child in a mainstream school (Mattingly and McInerney 2010, 5). 
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It can also be noted that in 2012 in the UK only 46.3% of working age persons with disabilities were in 
employment compared to 76.4% of working age non-disabled persons (Labour Force Survey, Quarter 
2, 2012). Such statistics suggest persons with disabilities are more likely than persons without 
disabilities to be dependent on benefits for a large proportion of their income (Wood and Grant 2010, 
34) and thus that the added costs of disability do not necessarily reduce once a child becomes an adult.  
 
However, the picture painted above will not apply in all cases of disability and it may well be the case, 
as has been noted by Wilkinson that  “for some disabilities… lifetime consumption of health and 
welfare resources is at or below the national average” (Wilkinson 2010, 101) and thus that the creation 
of persons who are disabled may be no more likely to burden existing members of society than the 
creation of non-disabled persons. This point is illustrated well by reference to a study undertaken in the 
1990’s by Barendregt, Bonneux and van der Maas which showed that smokers tend, on average, to 
incur between 7 and 11% less healthcare costs over the course of their lifetime than non-smokers which 
means that even before taxes, smokers cost public health care systems less than non-smoking citizens 
(Wilkinson 2010, 103) because “smoking tends to cause few problems during a person’s productive 
years and then kills them before social security and pensions payments are made” (Persaud 1995, 284). 
We can note therefore, that persons with certain late-onset genetic disorders, disabilities and 
propensities towards certain illnesses may well, in virtue of their conditions causing them few 
problems during their childhood’s and productive years end up contributing far more and costing far 
less, in terms of social and healthcare resources than the average citizen. In such cases, arguments for a 
duty to select against disability based on the costs associated with accommodating disability will not 
apply.14 
 
The second of our questions is more theoretical. For, when it can be shown in a particular case that 
selection for disability is liable to involve added costs that are not justified by appeals to the claims of 
justice of the parents themselves or made irrelevant by the production of other benefits, it must be 
shown too that these extra costs are not themselves the result of injustice. How we respond to this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Indeed, even in cases where evidence points to the conclusion that bringing to birth a child with a particular disability is liable 
to impose a significant burden of support on others, it should be acknowledged, as was pointed out by an anonymous reviewer in 
an earlier incarnation of this paper, that in many cases the costs associated with the provision of items such as mobility 
equipment will be misleading and cannot be accurately assessed by appeals to current expenditure. For, they are often 
unnecessarily inflated by legal requirements which set standards for the safety and functionality to the needs of the most severely 
disabled rather than to the needs of the individual which thus leads to a situation where individuals are provided with equipment 
which is not only more expensive than it might be but may in fact make the equipment less functional than it could be.    
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question is determined by the extent we hold disability itself to be maladaptive – inherently limiting 
“the range of opportunity open to the individual in which he may construct his plan of life or 
conception of the good” (Daniels 1985, 27) – socially constructed - “a result of a failure to account for 
everyone when designing physical, economic and social institutions” (Asch 2003, 319) – or a mixture 
of the two. For, should we subscribe to the former view, it is understandable that we might hold those 
who choose to bring into the world lives liable to impose a burden on other members of society morally 
and financially responsible for their choices.  
Should we subscribe to the latter or a mixed view however, that we should condemn those who make 
such a decision when they might have chosen differently becomes less apparent. For, on such views, 
disability and its costs are, to some greater or lesser extent, non-normative and external to the 
individual, fixed by one’s status as member of a minority group. On such views the costs associated 
with accommodating disability are akin to the costs of ensuring the equal participation of black persons 
and women in a historically racist/sexist society. They are the result of decades, if not centuries, of 
thoughtless and discriminatory choices on the part of policy makers that are expensive to retrofit and 
whilst real are costs that are, at least partly, of our own making which should arguably be borne not 
only by those who choose to reproduce but also by those who benefit from and are responsible for the 
existence of such social structures.   
It would, after-all seem foolish to design our social structures in such a way that means that the basic 
needs of the minority are cheaper to meet than the basic needs of the majority and unrealistic, in a 
society with finite resources, to expect that we should design our social institutions in such a way that 
means that all can access them if to do so would be prohibitively expensive. For, if we assume that a 
basic requirement of a just society is that all reach some certain level of some particular currency of 
justice (welfare, resources, capabilities etc.) and note too that we have limited means of achieving this 
distribution, it seems that in order to use our resources wisely we must ensure a just distribution that is 
also maximally efficient. In many cases, of course, access and opportunity for persons with disabilities 
and persons without are compatible with one another and social institutions can be designed that serve 
both groups equally well. However, in others it makes more economic sense to design such structures 
in ways that fit the needs of the majority and retain sufficient resources to make adjustments for and 
ensure the ability to fully participate of those whose needs differ from the norm, and where this is not 
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possible, provide such individuals with compensation which, of course, both explains and justifies the 
added expense of disability in cases where the added costs of disability are the result, not of individual 





Should prospective parents select against disability in their offspring in situations where they have a 
choice? In recent years this question has been addressed in great depth, and from a number of different 
angles, by scholars concerned with questions of reproductive ethics. Some have asked whether we 
might ground an obligation to select against disability in the interests of the children we may create, 
others in notions of what it means to be a good or virtuous parent and others still in the impersonal 
claim that those who choose not to select against disability choose to make the world a poorer place 
than it might have been had they chosen differently. Within this paper however, rather than focusing on 
the above arguments I chose to explore and examine a relatively neglected family of arguments which 
focus on the real or perceived person-affecting harms that a failure to select against disability may 
impose on ‘others’ than the child created.  
 
This was done for a number of reasons. Firstly, I aimed to fill a gap in the literature by developing and 
exploring arguments often mentioned in passing but rarely fully unpacked or examined. Secondly, I 
wished to show that despite failure in certain contexts due to the conclusions of the non-identity 
problem, appeals to person affecting harms need not be abandoned in favour of impersonal and duty or 
virtue based arguments when discussing questions of the rights and wrongs of reproduction. Thirdly 
and finally I also wished to move away from the belief that reproductive activities are in some sense 
sacred and that our reproductive choices should thus be immune from the criticisms often faced by 
other activities on the basis of the externalities they produce. With this in mind within this paper three 
possible arguments for a limited moral obligation to select against disability based on person affecting 
harms to those other than the fetus were identified and subsequently explored.  
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The first argument was rather narrow in nature, focusing on the potential harms that prospective 
parents may impose on themselves as a result of a decision not to select against disability. Appeals to 
such harms as a basis for an obligation to select against disability however were found wanting for 
three reasons. Firstly, it was noted that procreative desires are not necessarily based in considerations 
of self-interest and thus whether or not a decision to procreate is liable to be harmful will not 
necessarily be relevant in cases where decisions to procreate are based in considerations of duty or are 
primarily a-rational in nature. Secondly it was also suggested that basing an obligation on parental 
harms would require us to subscribe to a remarkably strong account of autonomy as, on conventional 
(weak) accounts, prospective parents are held to be able to consent to harming themselves and may, in 
fact, be harmed more greatly by paternalistic interferences. Finally, and most importantly however, it 
was also shown - by appeals to research comparing indicators of parental wellbeing for parents of 
disabled and non-disabled children – that it is far from clear that decisions not to select against 
disability are actually liable, on balance, to be any more harmful than decisions to do so.  
 
The second and third arguments, which focused on the ‘burdens’ that decisions not to select against 
disability may impose on others such as siblings, other dependents, taxpayers and those whose 
entitlements to public assistance may be diminished by such a choice, were found to be more 
promising. For, whilst parents may accept the harms they might impose on themselves as a result of 
their reproductive choices and it is generally held that resources (financial and otherwise) should often 
be distributed unequally between persons with and persons without a disability, when it comes to 
assessing the rightness or wrongness of a particular procreative choice this is irrelevant. Instead, in 
such cases we must compare “(1) the effects of that choice on each person, against (2) the effects of 
each alternative choice, including those that exclude bringing [the child with a disability] into 
existence” (Roberts 2009, 29). 
 
Regarding the impact that a decision to bring to birth a child with a disability may have on a particular 
reproducer’s existing children and other dependents it was thus noted that the added expense and other 
parental resources that a disabled child may require could serve to diminish the welfare of other 
dependants. Similarly, regarding the interests of other members of society it was noted that a decision 
not to select against disability, at least in societies with socialised medical and welfare systems, is more 
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likely to impose a significant burden of assistance and financial support than a choice to bring to birth a 
non-disabled child and that this may be problematic on desert-sensitive accounts of moral obligation. 
 
However, whilst this is so, it was also shown in regards to both arguments that whether or not 
consideration of such harms will be decisive is actually highly contingent on the circumstances 
surrounding such choices. These include but are not limited to considerations of the nature and severity 
of the disability in question, whether or not its severity can be determined with any accuracy prior to 
birth, the kinds and extent of the burdens that selection against disability may impose on the parents 
themselves, the limits of partial parental obligations to their dependents, and  the extent to which the 
added costs associated with a particular disability can be shown to be the result, not of individual 
impairment or limitation, but of injustice.  
 
With the above in mind it is suggested that although there cannot, on the part of prospective parents, 
exist a general moral obligation to select against disability on the basis of harm to others there will be 
scenarios in which appeals to such harms can provide significant, although not decisive, reason to 
select against disability in their offspring. Appeals to other regarding harms seem then to result in a 
rather complex answer to this question when they are given the space and thought required for a full 
exploration. This, therefore, may explain the reluctance within the philosophical community to employ 
arguments resting on this basis. However, despite this, consideration of the balance of harms and 
benefits produced by reproductive choices does offer valuable insight into, and provides sensible and 
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